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Abstract 
In view of the low efficiency problem in the existing authentication protocols, the paper proposes a highly 
effective authentication which can authenticate identities of the important entities in the foremost time, as well as the 
session key can be negotiated efficiently. The objective and security properties of the protocol are analyzed by 
utilizing the logical verification method. The security and efficiency of the proposed protocol are discussed. The 
results show that the proposed protocol can not only resist personating the entities and messages replay attacks, but 
also can resist DoS attacks effectively, meanwhile the proposed protocol has better efficiency. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
In the distributed environment, such as mobile networks, there are two security requirements need to 
be considered. One is identity authentication, and the other is data confidentiality for transmission. 
However, the existing authentication infrastructures, such as Kerberos and X.509, are suitable for the 
centralized network environment. The protocols need the centralized certification authority called as CA. 
Some researchers [1] [2] have proposed the improved protocols, which enhancing the authentication 
efficiency of entity identities. However, several shortcomings or vulnerabilities of these schemes 
discussed in some researches [3] [4]: (1) the entity B cannot authenticate the main entity A in the foremost 
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time. (2) The cost of computation of the entity (A or B) and communication are high. (3) The 
public/private key pairs bound in a certificate are used for encryption and signature at the same time. This 
is not a good idea in public key cryptography. (4) The entities are vulnerable to Denial of Services (DoS) 
attacks.
Focusing on solving above vulnerabilities, Ref. [4] has proposed an efficient authentication scheme. 
In FAKES, using hash chain technique, the authenticated tokens are constructed for the main entity 
(called as mobile user), by which service provider can authenticate mobile users in the foremost time. 
We conclude the previous works and give an improved and complete description of authentication 
protocol (AP) in this paper. Furthermore, the security properties of the protocol are analyzed by the 
formal analytical process. The analyses show that the protocol AP does not only resolve the problems 
exposed in existing protocols, but also enhances authentication efficiency. 
2. The proposed protocol 
Three main entities in the proposed protocol AP are involved: the main entity (A), the entity (B) and 
the trusted third party (TTP), which is trusted by the entity A and B. In addition, the attacker (I) is 
involved when the protocol AP is analyzed.  
2.1.  Hash chains v.s. Tokens 
The authenticated tokens are used to achieve an authentication of the main entity A in the foremost 
time. The tokens are constructed by using hash chains. The identity validity of the entity A is verified via 
one-way of the Hash Function. A hash chain [5] is generated by multiple iterations of a secure hash 
function upon a secret seed. Thus, a unique sequence of proof materials (links, we also call them tokens) 
is generated, and the tip of the chain will be published. The links will be released conversely and can be 
verified via the tip T0 of the chain. Examples built upon the concept of hash chains include key-
distribution [6], micro-payments and efficient multicasting.  
The entity A constructs his own hash chain and computes tokens set. A secure hash function h with
security parameter k is first selected, h:{0,1}*a  {0,1}k, a seed s is randomly picked and then h is
recursively applied to the seed s n times. The i-th token TokenA
i of the A is equal to h
n-i
(s). The tip T0 of the 
chain, called as the authentication root, is recorded as TokenA
0, where TokenA
0 = h
n
(s). TokenA
0 is used to 
verify validity of other tokens.  
2.2. The proposed authentication protocol 
In the paper, we propose authentication protocol (AP). The protocol has two goals. One is that the 
entities A and B accomplish the identity authentication based on the tokens. The other is that the entities A
and B negotiate the session key KA_B.
Every message in the protocol AP is protected by the message authentication code (MAC) except for 
the first message. The integrity and data-origin authentication of the first message can be verified 
implicitly by the entity A’s tokens.
The MACs in the protocol AP have three functions: (1) Integrity protection. (2) Origin authentication. 
(3) Key confirmation – some MACs, such as MAC1, MAC2 and MAC3, are computed using some secret 
material which are owned by the particular entity so that the receiver can confirm that the sender of the 
messages has already generated the correct key which was derived from some data only known by the 
sender and receiver. The protocol AP is described formally as follows:  
(1) AJB：IDA,IDB,TokenAn-2,{TS , TokenA n-1, {KA_B}KMAC1}KTTP_PK , MAC1 
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(2) BJTTP：IDA,IDB, TokenAn-2,{TS, TokenA n-1, {KA_B}KMAC1 }KTTP_PK , MAC2 
(3) TTPJB：IDA ,IDB ,{TS, SUCC,{KA_B}KMAC1} KB_TTP_1 , MAC3 
(4) BJA：IDA,IDB,{TS ,SUCC}KA_B , MAC4 
The terms in the proposed protocol are described as follows. TS denotes the timestamp produced by 
the principals. NA denotes the random number produced by the A. The tokens TokenA
n-2 and TokenA
n-1 are
defined as TokenA
n-2=hn-1(s), TokenA
n-1=hn(s). KTTP_PK denotes the TTP’s public key. KA_B produced by the 
entity A is a shared session key between the entity A and B, which is encrypted with the shared key KMAC1,
and then is encrypted under the public key KTTP_PK. KA_B will be exchanged securely after the 
authentication between the entity A and B is achieved. KA_B is defined as follows, KA_B =PRF-128(IDA ,
IDB ,NA) , PRF-128 denotes the pseudo-random number generation function and its output length is 128bit. 
The message authentication codes MAC1~ MAC4, which guarantee the integrity of the message flows (1) 
~ (4) in the protocol, are defined as follows:  
MAC1=HMAC(IDA ,IDB ,TokenA
n-2, {TS ,TokenA
 n-1, {KA_B}KMAC1 }KTTP_PK , KMAC1)
MAC2=HMAC(KB_TTP_2, IDA, IDB, TokenA
n-2, {TS, TokenA
 n-1, {KA_B}KMAC1 }KTTP_PK  , KMAC2)
MAC3=HMAC(KB_TTP_2, IDA, IDB, {TS, SUCC, {KA_B}KMAC1}KB_TTP_1 , KMAC2 )
MAC4=HMAC(IDA, IDB, { TS, SUCC} KA_B , KMAC1)
Where KMAC1 is a shared key by the entity A and B, KMAC2 is a shared key by the entity B and the TTP.
SUCC denotes that the identity authentication between the entity A and B is successful. KB_TTP_1 and 
KB_TTP_2 are two sub-keys shared by the entity B and the TTP. KB_TTP_1 is used to encrypt the data 
transmitted between the entity B and the TTP, and KB_TTP_2 is used to construct MAC of the messages 
transferred between the entity B and the TTP.
3. Security properties analysis of the protocol  
The section utilizes the logical verification method in Ref. [7] to analyze the protocol AP. Due to 
limited space, here the logical method and its proof are no longer described. 
3.1. Analysis of authentication goal 
Step1. Present formalization definition of the authentication goal of the main entity A.
G1 belie(MU,share(A, SP, KA_B+))
G2 belie(A,fresh(KA_B ))
G3 belie(A,belie(B, share(B, A, KA_B-)))
G4 belie(A,belie(B, fresh (KA_B ))) 
Step2. List the initial assumption of the main entity A.
P1 belie(A,posse(A,KA_B))
P2 belie(A,fresh(KA_B))
P3 belie(A,fresh(TS)) 
P4 belie(A,share(A,B,KMAC1))
P5  recei(A,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B), H((IDA, B, E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)),KMAC1)))
P6 belie(A,recei(A,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC), KA_B), H((IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)),KMAC1)))) 
P7 belie(A,○<tsend(B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B))∧recei(A, E((TS,SUCC),KA_B))Jbelie(B,share(B,A,KA_B-
))∧belie(B, fresh(KA_B)) 
Step3. Make logical inference verification for the authentication goal of the main entity A.
(1)  recei(A,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B), H((IDA,B, E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)),KMAC1)))Jbelie(A, recei(A,
(IDA,B, E((TS,SUCC),KA_B),H((IDA,B, E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)), KMAC1))))                                   AB1,P5,NER
(2)  belie(A,recei(A,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B),H((IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)),KMAC1))))  
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AB2,P6,MPR,(1) 
(3)  belie(A,recei(A,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)))                                    AB1,AMR,(2) 
(4)  belie(A,○<tsend(B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B))                                                         AB1,AB2,P4,MPR,(2) 
(5)  belie(A,belie(B,share(B,A,KA_B-))) 
belie(A,belie(B,fresh(KA_B)))                                                                                      AB1,P7,(3),(4) 
(6)  belie(A,share(A,B,KA_B-))                                                                                         AB1,P1,(3),(4) 
(7)  belie(A,posse(B,share(A,B,KA_B)))∧○<tsend(B, (TS,SUCC))                              AB1,ASA1,P1,(3) 
(8) belie(A,recei(A,(TS,SUCC)))                                                                                AB1,ACC1,P1,(3) 
(9) belie(A,fresh(E((TS,SUCC),KA_B)))                                                                     AB1,AMF1,P3,(7) 
(10) belie(A,send(B,E((TS,SUCC),KA_B))                                                                  AB1,ANV,(6),(9) 
(11) belie(A,share(A,B,KA_B+))                                                                                   AB1,(6),(7),(10) 
From the above (5), (11) and (P2), we can get that the authentication goal of the entity A is satisfied. 
Step4. Present formalization definition of the authentication goal of the entity B.
G5 belie(B,share(B,A,KA_B+))
G6 belie(B,fresh(KA_B))
G7 belie(B,belie(A,share(A,B, KA_B-)))
G8 belie(B,belie(A,fresh(KA_B))) 
Step5. List the initial assumption of the entity B.
P1 belie(B,posse(A,KA_B))
P2 belie(B,fresh(TS)) 
P3 belie(B,share(B,CS,KMAC2)) 
P4 belie(B,share(B,CS,KCS_B_1)) 
P5 belie(B,share(B,A,KMAC1))
P6 recei(B,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B,KMAC1)), KB_CS_1),H((KB_CS_2,IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B,
KMAC1)), KB_CS_1)),KMAC2))
P7 belie(B,recei(B,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B, KMAC1)),KB_CS_1),H((KB_CS_2,IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC, 
E(KA_B, KMAC1)),KB_CS_1)),KMAC2)))
P8 belie(B,○<tsend(A,share(B,A,KA_B-)))Jbelie(A, share(A,B,KA_B-))∧belie(A,fresh(KA_B))
Step6. Make logical inference verification for the authentication goal of the entity B.
(1)  recei(B,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KB_CS_1),H((KB_CS_2,IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B,
KMAC1)), KB_CS_1)), KMAC2))Jbelie(B,recei(B, (IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC, E(KA_B,KMAC1)),KB_CS_1), H((KB_CS_2,
IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC, E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KB_CS_1)),KMAC2)))                                                          AB1,P6,NER
(2) belie(B,recei(B,(IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KB_CS_1),H((KB_CS_2,IDA,B,E((TS,SUCC, 
E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KB_CS_1)),KMAC2)))                                                                             AB1,AB2,P7,MPR,(1) 
(3) belie(B,○<tsend(CS,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KB_CS_1)))                    AB1,AB2,P3,MPR,(2) 
(4) belie(B,recei(B,E((TS,SUCC,E(KA_B,KMAC1)),KB_CS_1)))                                                    AB1,AMR,(2) 
(5)  belie(B,recei(B,(TS,SUCC,E(KA_B,KMAC1))))                                                      AB1,ACC1,P4,(4) 
(6)  belie(B,recei(B,E(KA_B,KMAC1)))                                                                               AB1,AMR,(5) 
(7)  belie(B,○<tsend(A,share(B,A, KA_B)))                                                                  AB1,ASA1,P5,(6) 
(8)  belie(B,belie(A,share(A,B,KA_B)))
 belie(B,belie(A,fresh(KA_B)))                                                                                          AB1,P8,(7) 
(9) belie(B,belie(A,share(A,B,KA_B-)))                                                                                 AB1,P1,(8) 
(10) belie(B,recei(B,share(B,A,KA_B)))                                                                    AB1,ACC1,P5,(6) 
(11) belie(B,share(B,A,KA_B))                                                                                           AB1,(7),(10) 
(12) belie(B,posse(B,share(B,A,KA_B)))                                                                      AB1,AMP1,(10) 
(13) belie(B,share(B,A,KA_B))                                                                                        AB1,P1,(6),(7) 
(14) belie(B,fresh(KA_B))                                                                                          AB1,AMF1,P5,(5) 
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By the above-mentioned analyses, we can get that the protocol satisfies the authentication goal of the 
entity B. Both of the entities A and B believe that KA_B is a shared session key suitable for the 
communication, and they firmly believe the key is fresh. 
3.2.  Analysis of key confidentiality goal 
Step1. Present formalization definition of the key confidentiality goal. 
G    ¬ (in(KA_B, POSI)∧in(KMAC1, POSI)∧in(KMAC2, POSI)∧in(KB_CS_1,POSI)∧in(KB_CS_2,POSI)
∧in(KCS-1 , POSI)∧in(KA-1 , POSI)∧in(KB-1 , POSI)) 
Step2. List initial set and own set of attacker. Assume that attacker’s initial assumption set is INI_SI,
and its initial own set is POSI
O.
INI_SI = {¬ ( in(KCS-1 , POSI)∧in(KA-1 , POSI)∧in(KB-1 , POSI))},  POSI0 = { KCS, KA , KB}
Step3. Make logical inference verification for the key confidentiality goal. 
Realization of the key confidentiality goal depends on whether the secret keys of the legal protocol 
subjects are included in the final own set of the attacker. 
Proof: Since the network environment of E-Business transaction is open, during the execution of the 
protocol, the attacker is enabled to intercept, wiretap and juggle protocol message. First of all, we analyze 
the statement (1) in the protocol. For attacker, after the statement has executed, we can get, 
recei(I,(IDA ,B ,TokenA
n-2,E((TS, TokenA
 n-1, E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KCS), H((IDA ,B,TokenA
n-2,E((TS,TokenA
 n-1,
E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KCS), KMAC1 )))                                      (2.1) 
From the above formula and the message receive axiom AMR of the logical method, we can obtain 
 recei(I, E((TS, TokenA
 n-1,E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KCS))    (2.2) 
recei(I,H((IDA ,B , TokenA
n-2, E((TS, TokenA
 n-1, E(KA_B, KMAC1)), KCS), KMAC1 )))                               (2.3) 
From the attacker’s initial assumption set INI_SI and initial own set POSI
O, we have known, 
¬ (in(KCS-1, POSI)∧in(KMAC1, POSI))                 (2.4) 
From (2.2), (2.4) and the ciphertext comprehending axioms ACC1 of the logical method, we can get 
¬ in(E(KA_B, KMAC1), POSI)                                  (2.5) 
From (2.4), (2.5) and the ciphertext comprehending axioms ACC1 of the logical method, we can have 
¬ in(KA_B, POSI)                                                   (2.6) 
From (2.3), similarly, the expression (2.6) holds. 
Similarly analyzing the last three statements in the protocols, we can get 
¬ (in(KMAC2, POSI)∧in(KB_CS_1, POSI)∧in(KB_CS_2, POSI))                                                            (2.7) 
From (2.4)~(2.7), initial assumption set and formalization definition of the key confidentiality, we can 
conclude that the protocol AP satisfies the key confidentiality goal. Hence, we prove the security goals of 
the protocol AP through the above logical analysis. 
4. Discussions on security and efficiency of protocol AP 
4.1. Security of protocol AP 
(1) DoS Resistance. The protocol AP can reduce the risk of DoS attacks constructed by attackers using 
forged protocol messages. The first message can answer whether origin of message is valid, and verifying 
the entity A consumes very little computation because the verification algorithm only involves hash 
function. This is the significant property of our protocol.  (2) Replay Resistance. Hash chains used as 
tokens have an inherent property that is replay resistance. Legal entity A owns the valid tokens. The nodes 
of hash chains are used in inverted sequence, and the one-way of the secure Hash Function ensures the 
tokens not to be forged. Each of tokens released is fresh, which not to be reused, and not to be repeatedly 
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released, that is, the freshness of the protocol message can be ensured. (3) Masquerade resistance. It is 
infeasible for adversaries to masquerade legitimate entity A because they do not have legitimate private 
keys according to the public keys used for encryption. (4) Forgery Resistance. It is computationally 
infeasible for adversaries to forge tokens without knowing secret seed of a hash chain if hash function 
deployed is cryptographic secure. That means the hash function has properties: strong one-way and 
collision-proof. Practical instances of hash function are MD5, SHA-1 or SHA256.  
4.2. Efficiency of protocol AP 
The protocol P1 in Ref. [1] has no sufficient consideration of resources limitation of the entity A in 
mobile networks. Signatures in twice and verifications in three times must be performed. However, in AP, 
the entity A will need support the encryption operation of the public key, and will not need to support the 
operations of decryption, signature and verification. While deploying high-efficient public key encryption 
algorithm, such as RSA, the entity A only consumes very little computation.  
The second important feature of AP is that authentication efficiency is better than P1 in Ref. [1], AP 
only needs fewer messages, four message flows. It is even smaller than the protocol in Ref. [3], which 
needs five message flows. The TTP authenticates the entity A only by means of one time operation of 
hash function in the foremost time.  
Compared with P1 and EWAI, fewer message flows are needed for entity identity authentication and 
key agreement in AP. Hence, the consumption of AP is the least in computation and communication. 
5. Conclusions 
The existing protocols [1] [2] give more opportunities for attackers to launch DoS attacks that 
consume more entities’ resources on computation and communication. An improved protocol AP is 
presented, which can not only resist reply attack, impersonation attack and DoS attack, but consumes very 
few resources while achieving identity authentication and key agreement. The other contribution of the 
paper is that we use the logical method to prove rigorously the security properties of the protocol AP.  
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